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WHY CONTRACTS ARE WRITTEN IN "LEGALESE"
CLAIRE A. HILL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drafting and negotiating complex business contracts is difficult.
It requires prodigious memory capacity as well as imagination. How
does the lawyer know what the contract ought to cover besides the
bare promises to buy and sell or borrow and lend?'
Not surprisingly, lawyers have come up with a production pro-
cess by which each lawyer can access the accumulated wisdom of
many: the "form." The form is typically not a form in the "fill-in-the-
blanks" sense; rather, it is an actual contract the lawyer or someone
she works with has used in one or more previous transactions.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I wish to acknowledge
helpful comments by participants at the Canadian Law and Economics Association conference
in 1997, the Industrial Organization Workshop at the Washington University School of Law and
Department of Economics, and faculty workshops at the University of Wisconsin Law School,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, and the University of Maryland Law School. I also wish to
acknowledge helpful comments from Peg Brinig, Vik Khanna, Edward Lane-Reticker, Leandra
Lederman, Mark Lemley, and Stewart Macaulay.
1. Indeed, acquisition and financing agreements are the mainstays of large law firm
corporate practice.
2. In my experience, some law firms have aspired to, but never quite achieved, the goal of
having a firm-wide form. It's not as though the forms used within a firm, or for that matter, by
different firms, differ enormously in content; they do, however, look quite a bit different. The
provisions might be phrased differently or be in a different order. There might be different
drafting conventions as to the defined terms, always an important aspect of agreements. And
there are many other matters of this sort; again, the documents "do" more or less the same
things but cannot really be said to be the same "form." There are a few industry-wide forms.
The two most prominent such forms are a model indenture published by the American Bar
Foundation, and the form for swap transactions. Both forms reflect regulatory and institutional
conditions not generally present in the everyday world of mergers and acquisitions and
financing agreements. Much of an indenture's content is dictated by statute, and/or details how
nonadversarial, mechanical duties (such as issuing notes to replace lost or stolen notes) are to be
performed. As to swaps, there is a fill-in-the-blanks form, developed by the International
Association of Swap Dealers, a trade association. The individually negotiated terms are
contained in an annex. Documentation plays a much different role in swap transactions than it
does in acquisition or financing transactions: indeed, the swap documentation is often not
completed until a month after the transaction has occurred. Furthermore, many, and perhaps
most, terms of a swap are virtually incomprehensible to lawyers; if lawyers are to be involved at
all in the transactions, which they typically are only if the swap is part of another transaction
involving more legal structuring, a form, developed by finance professionals who understand
swaps, is needed. Also, some lenders have fill-in-the-blanks forms for loans they will make. In
my experience, these forms suffer many of the same defects as the actual contracts used as
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Over time, the form evolves, mostly for the better. Many mis-
takes, especially those with serious consequences, get corrected.
Contingencies discovered "the hard way," through painful and
expensive experience, are addressed. And other improvements are
made. But the results are far from perfect. The imperfections chiefly
are unnecessary length and complexity-the very attributes often
bemoaned in popular accounts.3 Sometimes the imperfections are
more serious: ambiguities that go uncorrected. As I will argue, the
production process, meant to help lawyers learn quickly and
efficiently from their experience and from that of others, leads,
perhaps intractably, to these imperfections. For expository purposes,
I characterize contract drafting and negotiating as a production
process, addressing a question to which there's admittedly an obvious
answer: Why aren't contracts drafted from scratch? My answer
frames my account of the contract production process, illustrating
how multiple iterations do not always improve, and sometimes even
worsen, the form. My interest in considering contract forms is
twofold. First, I want to show how rational, and, what some would
consider irrational,4 elements can combine to create a serviceable, but
arguably second-best, product. Work on "standardized" or
"boilerplate" contract terms has considered these issues.' My work
forms, and for many of the same reasons. The role of cumulation is different, but by the time
the form was developed, much of the damage had been done. In support of this position, I
direct readers to the Appendix, which contains a provision from such a form. Certainly,
developers of these sorts of forms are not much concerned with clarifying the language, making
major structural changes, or doing much else in the way of "clean up"-the main aims are to
standardize the lender's loans, and to make sure the agreement "works."
3. For an example see infra Appendix. It sets forth an actual contractual provision used
in many loan agreements. Indeed, the provision comes from a form developed as a form,
making its unwieldiness all the more remarkable.
4. Herbert Simon explains the difference between rationality in economics and rationality
in psychology as follows: economics' concept of rationality is "substantive" whereas
psychology's is more "procedural." "Substantive" for this purpose means advancing particular
ends (say, money and power); "procedural" rationality takes preferences as given, as ends, and
asks whether the behavior was a sensible means to achieve the ends. All the behavior I describe
is "rational" in the psychological sense; all of it may, however, not be rational in the economic
sense. I generally attempt to avoid using the word "rational" because the phenomenon I am
describing has both economic and psychological components. When I do use the word
"rational," I am using the economics meaning, as defined by Simon. Herbert A. Simon,
Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25, 26-27 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986).
It should be noted, however, that some economists use the term "rationality" rather more
broadly, importing some part of the psychological use.
5. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation]; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
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focuses on an overlapping but distinct phenomenon: the persistence
of redundancy and the ubiquity of cumbersome, inartful, and
sometimes imprecise drafting.
Second, and more generally, I want to illustrate that the demar-
cation between path-dependence and network-effect explanations on
the one hand, and efficiency explanations on the other hand, may be
more complex and nuanced than present literature acknowledges.
Path-dependence and network-effect explanations explain how
inefficient, "second-best" phenomena come about and survive. These
types of explanations are increasingly becoming popular in the
literature. By contrast, efficiency explanations present the phenome-
non being explained as "first best." The debate between path-
dependence theorists and efficiency theorists is sometimes couched,
with only slight exaggeration, as a debate as to whether history
matters in explaining the types of phenomena law and economics
considers. Path-dependence theorists argue that it does; efficiency
theorists ostensibly argue that it does not. The "same" phenomenon
can be either the product of a path-dependent process (and hence
second best or inefficient) or efficient depending on how the
phenomenon itself is described. I show how business contracts can be
characterized as second best, needing history as an explanation or,
indeed, an excuse; or, alternatively, business contracts can be viewed
as closer to efficient. The description of the phenomenon is critical.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the production
process by which complex business contracts are drafted and
negotiated in large law firms. It models the process as a way of
imparting to each lawyer the accumulated wisdom of her prede-
cessors. Part III considers how economic and psychological6 dynamics
operate in the contract drafting and negotiating process. Indeed,
[hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence]. These articles consider path dependence
and network effects. For a general discussion of network effects, see Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
6. Increasingly, legal academics are considering the applicability of psychological
(behavioral) forces to legal phenomena. For a general overview of the subject, see 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998) (containing a collection of articles on behavioral law and economics) and a
Vanderbilt Law Review symposium, Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human
Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV 1497 (1998). See also Donald
C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995). Some of the most
important work drawn on by legal scholars is by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. See,
e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124 (1974), reprinted in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). For a recent addition to
the voluminous body of work connecting behavioral psychology to law and economics, see
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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some of the dynamics fall comfortably within the rubric of rational
self-interest maximization. Others perhaps represent departures from
"rationality," as that term commonly is used in economics. Part IV
summarizes the imperfections of complex contracts. It considers why
the form production process might persist despite these imper-
fections, stressing switching costs attributable to network and other
effects. It also considers certain specialization benefits to the form
production process. Finally, it compares other costs and benefits of
retaining the process versus switching. Part V concludes, addressing
why multiple iterations don't make contracts "perfect."
II. CONTRACT DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATION: GENESIS AND USE
OF THE FORM
In Anatomy of a Merger, James Freund, a leading merger and
acquisition lawyer in New York, includes a playlet describing a mock
acquisition transaction, in which Suggestive Software, Ltd. is acquired
by Proliferating Products, Inc.7 In one scene, taking place on Friday,
December 27, the junior associate, Peter Preppie, is being lambasted
by his supervisor, the partner Perry Prudent, for having done a rotten
job in his first draft of the acquisition agreement:
PRUDENT: Merry Christmas, Pete. Now look fella, you'll just
have to forgive my candor but time's short and this draft of the
Proliferating-Suggestive agreement is an inferior job. The problem
is that you just didn't think! You walked out of here, you went into
the library, you grabbed that Screwloose binder off the shelf, you
had a photocopy made of the final contract, and you marked it up
for purposes of this draft. Don't you realize that the final Screw-
loose agreement represented the culmination of three weeks of
intensive negotiation on the part of a pretty smart seller's attorney?
You've got to start with the first draft of the Screwloose contract.
All that stuff in there about their right to defend lawsuits, and
all those materiality and knowledge caveats-they have no place in
the first draft of an agreement to buy Software; plus which you for-
got about the omission of the tax representation in Screwloose
because of that special problem of theirs. And then you left in all
that valuation language -average closing price, etc.-which was
fine in the Screwloose deal where the pricing was based on the
market price over a two-week period right before the closing, but is
completely inapplicable here since we're using a fixed number of
shares. You have to think, boy.
7. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 500-01 (1975).
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And then, in the one place you did a little thinking, Pete, it
seems to me you went too far. I know it's possible that they'll re-
peal the Copyright Act some day, but it doesn't really rise to a level
of probability sufficient to warrant three pages of provisions con-
ditional upon that event. 8
Get this thing fixed up, and let me see it first thing Monday.
This passage, meant in jest, nevertheless captures quite well a
junior lawyer's initiation into contract drafting. Indeed, in large-firm
practice, complex contracts are drafted and negotiated using a process
that permits much of the work to be done by somewhat more
experienced versions of Preppie. Such a process makes eminent
sense. A new product, custom-crafted for the client from a form, can
be produced quickly, and at far lower cost than a product crafted
from scratch. The form design enables the product to be produced by
lower-paid, less-senior and less-experienced lawyers. Given the
complex nature of the task, and the quick turnaround time typically
required, even the most experienced lawyer would have difficulty
remembering every step and detail; the form is a useful reminder.
The form also preserves the benefits of experience with its provisions,
both in the transacting community and, sometimes, in judicial
decisions. The form simplifies the mechanical task as well: a lawyer
"marks up" a form, using the existing structure and changing only
what's needed. A contract for client #2 is created quickly from client
#1's contract; global searches change the names and some other
words. The remaining changes are input mechanically, and the new
contract quickly emerges from the laser printer.
Within the present structure, it is hard to imagine drafting any
other way. Without a form, how would most junior lawyers have any
idea of what a contract should address? They have never bought a
multimillion-dollar company or taken out a multimillion-dollar loan.9
And they are not trained to reason by far-flung analogy, which might
permit them to use information from their past experiences in quite
different contexts. Furthermore, many conventions, such as drafting
conventions, have arisen; intuiting such conventions would be
impossible. Seniority and increasing judgment help. But even
8. Id.
9. In my view, law and economics can be enormously helpful to students by helping them
characterize perils and rewards generically. The students then have a systematic way to
consider perils and rewards in new contexts.
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Freund would probably not want to draft from scratch. 10 Ready
access to others' experience is crucial.
Returning to Freund's playlet: Preppie, who is quite inex-
perienced, nevertheless has major drafting responsibility for the
contract. Prudent, Freund's alter ego, presumably told Preppie to use
the form from the Screwloose transaction, a transaction on which
Prudent himself had worked." If Prudent had not worked on a
similar transaction in the recent past, he would tell Preppie to get a
form from another senior lawyer Prudent trusted, 12 and who had
worked on a similar transaction recently. Preppie decides how to
"mark up" the form-what to retain, what to change, and what to
add. Prudent reviews Preppie's draft, as described in the quote
above; Preppie then revises it and sends it to the other side. Prudent
and Preppie both attend the negotiations. Preppie's principal role is
as scribe; he drafts the agreed-upon changes and sends out the revised
agreements to the multi-person distribution list. Prudent probably
wants to see important changes before Preppie sends out the revised
draft. However, Prudent probably trusts Preppie to make minor
changes without supervision.
In this playlet, Prudent does the negotiations himself. However,
except in the largest transactions, someone as senior as Prudent (and
with as high a billing rate) would be unlikely to do the bulk of the
negotiations. Indeed, in many cases, someone at an early stage in his
career-say, a midlevel to senior associate-might do a great deal of
the negotiation, and perhaps all of it. One can readily imagine a
similar conversation in which a still comparatively junior Preppie
reports back to Prudent as to the results of the negotiations. Prudent
asks which of the contested points Preppie won, Preppie responds,
and Prudent perhaps rants that Preppie succeeded only on the less-
10. He might, however, fantasize about the perfect form. In my experience, many lawyers
have such fantasies. The perfect forms are sometimes even begun, but almost never completed.
And even if they are completed, they are not regularly updated for changes in law and other
matters.
11. Prudence sometimes dictates using two or more forms to make sure there's nothing
omitted; after all, it is far easier to spot an unnecessary provision than a missing one.
12. In many firms, especially those which admitted many "lateral" partners and associates,
a particular "group" of lawyers may be more comfortable with the way members of the group
practice than the ways nonmembers might practice. The groups' formation may reflect
commonality of subject matter or approach. There might be historical reasons why one group
thinks its way of doing things is far better than another's. For instance, one partner might be
admitted to the firm on account of the business that partner can bring in; others might feel his
style of practicing does not accord with the norms of the firm and would not want to use his
"forms" for their clients.
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important points but failed on the more important ones. Preppie then
is sent back to negotiate further. Over time, Preppie comes to
understand what is important and what is not, and what sorts of
arguments win and lose. 13
Like any junior lawyer, Peter Preppie needs to learn how to draft
and negotiate contracts. In the passage I quoted, Prudent is doing a
reasonable job of teaching him. He tells Preppie to think about which
form to use, and to think while marking up the form. He also tells
Preppie to consider the differences between the deal for which
Preppie is drafting the contract and the deal for which the contract
form was used.
The lesson Prudent is teaching Preppie is much more complex
than it appears. Preppie will presumably know, as would just about
anyone in Preppie's position, not to have three pages describing
consequences of the repeal of the Copyright Act next time he gives
Prudent a first draft. He will almost certainly know not to give such a
draft to any other senior lawyer. But Prudent wants Preppie to learn
a far more general lesson: he wants Preppie to learn not to write in
new provisions addressing contingencies as remote as the repeal of the
Copyright Act. Which contingencies are as remote as repeal of the
Copyright Act? How is Preppie to know? The generic instruction
"think" is scarcely much of a guide. But, coupled with a few
examples, it may be the best Prudent can do-Preppie will have to
look to his imagination and judgment, and, as time goes on,
experience, hopefully not so hard-won as in his encounter with
Prudent. Prudent speaks as though "thinking" were a matter of
brawn rather than brains-something you could simply do by trying
to do it. But Preppie's problem, as Prudent surely would agree, is not
lack of effort. After all, Preppie produced this draft quite quickly, in
the week that included Christmas Day. Preppie's problem is that he
doesn't know what to think about-and there may be no good way to
tell him.14
13. Preppie may eventually become another Freund; he also might never rise much beyond
his present level of ability. Most likely, he'll end up somewhere in the middle.
14. Can a lawyer be scared into "thinking"? In some cases, perhaps. I have known some
partners who terrify associates as a strategy; the strategy is to put the associates on notice that
they'll have to justify every provision in the agreement or suffer being shouted at by the partner.
This strategy sometimes may work in the short-term. The associates do "think," at least more
(and maybe better) than they would have otherwise. However, the strategy often backfires.
The desirable associates, the ones who can and do think, then avoid being assigned to the
shouting partner. Maybe firms keep these partners around to make the other partners get the
benefit of the shouting-induced training to "think" while looking good and reasonable by
comparison-a "good cop-bad cop" dynamic?
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This dynamic extends far beyond determinations about which
contingencies to include in a contract. Learning effectively from
experience requires generalizing to an experience's salient features.
There is no formula to determine which features of an experience are
salient. Overgeneralizing is common in everyday life, and can
sometimes take the form of superstition (I'd better not do X because
the last time I did X... ). Undergeneralizing is common as well, and is
a particular peril for the corporate lawyer. A lawyer suffers
professionally if she addresses in the B contract a bad outcome that
occurred in the A transaction but not a similar bad outcome that
actually occurs in the B transaction. ("We prohibited liens on
property the company purchased for more than $200,000; we didn't
prohibit liens on property the company purchased for less but
improved so that their aggregate expenditure exceeded $200,000.")
The 1967 movie Bedazzled15 illustrates the difficulties of learning
from experience. In the movie, Stanley Moon sold his soul to the
Devil for seven wishes. All Stanley wanted was to win over Margaret,
the waitress from Wimpy's. He tried various ways of accomplishing
this end, but every time the Devil managed to grant his wish in fact
but violate it in spirit. For instance, Stanley had always been tongue-
tied around Margaret; for his first wish, he asked the Devil to make
him articulate. Stanley wanted to converse so well with Margaret that
she'd fall in love with him. As the wish progresses, Margaret is
passionate about conversation, emboldening Stanley to take the next
step and suggest romance; needless to say, her passions don't carry
over into the romantic realm. His next wish is that she be very
physical; she is, but with everyone except Stanley. Next, he wishes for
them to be in love; they are, but they are married to other people.
And so on. Each time, Stanley crafts his wish precisely, so as to
prevent what has gone wrong before. But after several wishes, he is
no closer to landing Margaret than he was when the Devil discovered
him trying to hang himself in despair.
Stanley is undergeneralizing from his experience. He should
have learned to think about not just what had gone wrong, but what
else could have gone wrong-what sort of thing the thing that went
wrong was. And what sort of thing did not go wrong but could have.
There is no one correct level of generalization. More generally,
there is no one correct level of effort to be spent determining what a
15. BEDAZZLED (20th Century Fox 1967).
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contract should provide for. In some transactions, the contract's
words may be particularly crucial. For instance, the more devilish the
other side is known to be, the more effort one may need to spend;
reputational forces will not constrain a devilish party from taking
advantage of every gap in the contract, no matter how tiny. But at a
certain point, the effort may not be worthwhile: the Devil can always
find a way to grant Stanley's wish in fact but violate the spirit, no
matter how well-crafted the wish had been. 16
Prudent is trying to impart a much more general lesson: that
Preppie should defer to the form, but not unthinkingly-not "too
much." But again, how is Preppie to know how much is too much?
And it's not as though he can learn this lesson once and for all. He
presumably will learn the lesson better and better as time goes on;
nevertheless, he will likely continue to err for a long time in his
career. Some lawyers by temperament (risk lovers? overconfident?)
might tend to defer too little; in my experience, most will defer too
much.
The form provides a baseline from which to determine what the
contract should address. For instance, when Preppie is trying to
determine whether a contingency is sufficiently likely that it warrants
being addressed in a contract he's drafting, he will naturally apply a
different standard for contingencies the form already addresses.
Consider why: deleting a provision is an affirmative act. Why do it
without a good reason? But thinking of new contingencies takes
effort-brawn-as well as brains; Preppie simply might not think of
new contingencies as remote as some of those already addressed in
the form (or, for that matter, he might not think of new contingencies
far less remote than those already in the form).
When Prudent reviews Preppie's draft, he presumably focuses
more on deviations from the form-on things he is not used to seeing.
Prudent's reviewing strategy is sensible and intuitive. He trusts the
lawyers in his firm who created and "vetted" the form." He therefore
feels no need to review their work: the form-that is, the contract
given to Preppie to mark up. But Prudent has no reason at this point
to trust Preppie. 18 Thus, whatever Preppie's done by himself will
16. In this regard, consider "work-to-rule" job actions in which employees disrupt the
employer's business by abiding strictly to every applicable work rule.
17. The term "vetted" originally meant "given a security clearance." It has become a
metaphor for "approved" in various contexts.
18. Prudent indicates he has worked with Preppie before when he tells Preppie that
Preppie "forgot" about the special situation applicable to the previous draft. But we do not
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warrant particular scrutiny. But if each person skips over the more
familiar provisions quickly, assuming her (competent) predecessors
have considered it, many provisions may never have been vetted.
Nevertheless, given Prudent's billing rate, he is likely acting in his
client's best interest by conducting only the more abbreviated review.
A review from scratch would be quite costly; the likelihood that
Prudent would detect anything warranting this cost is small.
If something goes wrong later, both Preppie and Prudent can
argue that they acted reasonably, in accordance with an industry-wide
standard: the form production process. 9 Preppie, Prudent, and
Prudent's firm will look very bad if they do not provide for a
commonly provided-for remote contingency that actually occurs; they
will not look nearly as bad if they do not provide for an equally
remote contingency20 not commonly provided for.21
Thus, Preppie accords a rebuttable presumption to provisions in
the form. For particular provisions, he weighs whether the pre-
sumption has been rebutted. The presumption will not be rebutted
for benign provisions (such as the typical boilerplate about references
to one gender including the other and captions of provisions not
being part of the meaning of the provision); saving trees (or
secretarial overtime or shipping charges) will not be a sufficient
counterweight. His best guess may be that a provision seems benign,
but he's not completely sure: the calculation will favor keeping the
provisions. Indeed, Preppie will make as few changes as possible. He
know what level of responsibility Preppie had; he might have done no more than fetch the
coffee, which is indeed his main role in this playlet as well. If that is the case, Prudent's criticism
is, in my view, quite unfair. It is easy for Prudent, who understood what was going on at the
time, to have filed away in his mind the "special situation" story, but far harder for Preppie, who
might barely know what a representation and warranty is: Preppie might be so overwhelmed
with the new library he has to construct in his head that he might have difficulty shelving away
for later use the books (experiences) that he's been given.
19. Different firms' forms are not identical; indeed, firms compete in part by touting the
superiority of their forms. But the forms are sufficiently similar, as are the firms' staffing
practices, that an industry-wide standard, among firms doing the kinds of transactions this essay
addresses, does exist.
20. This discussion makes Preppie's determination seem simpler than it actually is: it's not
as though degrees of remoteness were determinable easily or, in some cases, at all. Still, there is
a sufficient consensus as to the more common sorts of contingencies that lawyers can, and do,
get a general sense of degrees of remoteness.
21. A lawyer always suffers for not having anticipated a contingency that occurs, regardless
of how remote the contingency was. The effect is far greater than the effect of having
anticipated and provided for a contingency that does not occur. The result is a bias in favor of
overinclusion. See generally Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 5. There are
costs to providing for remote contingencies; however, these weigh much less heavily in the
lawyers' computation. I discuss this matter further infra Section III.A.
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will often favor "band-aids," requiring the least tinkering possible,
over a more elegant, structural solution. The paradigm band-aid says
"anything else in this agreement to the contrary notwithstanding" or
other words to that effect. Preppie has been told that the form-the
contract he's marking up-"works": that the provisions, in the
aggregate, create internally consistent rights and duties, and cover the
appropriate universe of events and contingencies. He will worry that
any larger changes might make the contract not work.
Preppie's deference to the form accords with lawyers' prefer-
ences generally, including lawyers on the other side in the Suggestive
transaction. A lawyer used to seeing an article entitled Represen-
tations and Warranties immediately preceding an article entitled
Covenants and Agreements will find it easier to review a document
with these same articles in this order. Indeed, lawyers often use other
forms, as well as mental "forms," to compare forms they are asked to
review: in this respect, the reviewing process is similar to the drafting
process. Consider again Prudent's description of the problems with
Preppie's first draft: Prudent depicts himself and Preppie as using
physical (and mental) forms as a baseline, checking off inclusion of all
the usual items, noting deviations, and limiting in-depth consideration
mostly to those deviations.
After the transaction closes, neither Preppie nor Prudent will
have any incentive to review the final contract as signed, to "clean up
the form," replacing band-aids with more elegant solutions, and, more
generally, incorporating the insights they may have gotten during
time-pressured negotiating or drafting sessions. Who would such a
review benefit? Probably not the client, especially given what such a
review would cost.22 Moreover, since drafting and negotiating is
almost always done in the heat of the moment, the form likely would
not stay "clean" for long, unless the firm were willing to commence
an expensive, regular form-cleaning process.23 Finally, Prudent and
Preppie probably have moved on to other transactions. And Preppie
would just as soon not see the contract in the cold light of day, where,
he thinks, all the mistakes he's made will become glaringly obvious.
22. One exception: if the transaction were a loan, Preppie might be asked to prepare a
compliance checklist for the borrower or lender. He would look through the agreement to
identify the duties imposed on the party and list them in some user-friendly way.
23. The firm also could develop a perfect fill-in-the-blanks-style form it updated regularly
and required all its lawyers to use. I discuss the difficulties with developing such a form infra
Part IV.B.3.
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In Prudent's next transaction, he probably will tell the junior
lawyer assigned to him, Josephine Preppina,24 to ask Preppie for the
Suggestive contract. And the process will unfold very much as it did
with Preppie. Or perhaps he will work again with Preppie; the
process will still unfold substantially as it does above, since Preppie is
still far from having unlocked the mysteries of drafting and negotia-
ting contracts.
In the next part, I analyze the dynamics behind the story I have
just told. I discuss the incentives of firms, and lawyers within firms, at
both the junior and senior levels, to use the form production process.
I described above how this same process leads to the notoriously
cumbersome, difficult to read, inartfully drafted contracts. I identify
below economic and psychological factors accounting for this result.
III. WHY CONTRACTS AREN'T MORE PERFECT
A. Economic (External) Dynamics
Using time-tested forms, and changing them as little as possible,
makes sense for many reasons, even where the forms are unwieldy
and convoluted.25 Once a lawyer invests in learning how to use the
process and understanding the terms and structure of typical
contracts, the incremental cost for each subsequent use of the process
will be small, and the process will provide the cheapest and quickest
way to produce a contract. Reviewing contracts will be expedited as
well. Moreover, the transactional community has considered and
interpreted the standard provisions (including both boilerplate and
the more substantive provisions) many times. These are "network
effects," wherein each firm benefits from having firms generally using
similar forms,26 independent of the substantive merit of the particular
forms.27 A provision's lack of substantive merit as contrasted with a
less common alternative is not irrelevant; however, network benefits
can sometimes trump benefits of a "better" provision. There also
24. Josephine Preppina is my invention, not Freund's.
25. We need not explain the first mistake or imperfection. First iterations tend not to be
successful; indeed, multiple iterations have the job of improving on first and subsequent
attempts.
26. Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 5. Kahan and Klausner
distinguish between learning benefits, which are in the present, and network benefits, which are
in the future. Id. Here, I characterize both as network effects because the distinction is not
relevant for my analysis.
27. Id.
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may have been some judicial interpretations of particular provisions.2
Preserving the benefits of these existing interpretations provides
another reason to disfavor innovation.29
Other reasons are important as well. In the community of large
law firms, success need not require being a "star" -rather, meeting
some industry-wide standard of competence suffices. 30 But meeting
this standard requires effort, skill, and luck. Furthermore, whether
one meets the standard turns in part on whether one is perceived as
meeting the standard: in an appreciable number of cases, there is no
authoritative source to settle the matter. Information is not just
incomplete because it is costly; imperfection here is virtually
intractable.
The transactional community sets the standard to be met: use of
a production process whereby an existing contract, vetted by several
senior members of the firm (that is, an existing contract some of the
firm's lawyers have drafted and negotiated), is used as a form and
revised for a new transaction. There are many accepted ways to staff
a transaction; many factors are considered, including the complexity
of the transaction and the parties involved. But there is always some
senior-level oversight and often much junior-level day-to-day
drafting, revising, negotiating, and distributing of the contract. For
each lawyer, and indeed, for the lawyers' firms, following the
standard makes avoiding a bad outcome-that is, a bad outcome for
which the lawyer is blamed-easier and less costly.31 And indeed,
avoiding a bad outcome is tantamount to a good enough outcome. In
large-firm corporate practice, if a lawyer continues to pass muster at
28. Certainly, lawyers can better advise their clients as to the likely legal outcome if a
provision has already been interpreted by the courts: even the clearest new provision may
provide less certainty than a less clearly written provision with a settled judicial interpretation.
But in my experience, such benefits are rarely at issue; indeed, there has usually been no
interpretation of the provisions involved.
29. See generally Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 5; Kahan
& Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 5.
30. See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 5, at 353-58 (expanding on this
point, and considering it as an instance of "herd behavior"). An analogy can be made with
money managers. I discuss this dynamic as it applies to money managers in Claire A. Hill, Why
Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some Other
Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 174-78 (1997).
31. Moreover, when something goes wrong, a natural tendency is to locate the blame
somewhere within one's own choices, so as to believe that next time one can make a different
choice leading to a good outcome. Lawyers are thus well situated to take blame: the client may
want to believe that if he hires another lawyer next time, there will be a good outcome. If
there's no authoritative source in a fair number of cases, lawyers will need to make sure they're
able to pass muster with whatever serves as the alternative to the authoritative source.
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the senior level, doing her job competently and keeping her clients
satisfied, she will do quite well by most measures of "success."
Thus, the payoff to effort spent avoiding bad outcomes is high.
And this effort is coextensive with efforts to pursue ordinary good
outcomes: taking care overall. By contrast, the payoff to effort spent
pursuing extraordinarily good outcomes is lower. Exceptionally good
outcomes would require innovation: say, a different production
process with quite different-looking contracts with quite different
provisions. Innovation increases the risk of bad outcomes. Thus, one
cannot pursue extraordinarily good outcomes without incurring a
greater risk of bad outcomes. 32 Lawyers therefore rationally would
direct their energies more towards slightly exceeding the standard-
avoiding bad outcomes and pursuing ordinary good outcomes-than
on innovation.
The foregoing considers dynamics equally applicable to lawyers
and their firms. Junior lawyers also may benefit in ways that are
neutral or adverse to their firms by showing due deference to the
form production process and generating contracts that "do the job"
but concede little to elegance. The junior lawyer would, for instance,
make smaller, band-aid changes, and would refrain from making
structural changes or changing others' bad but serviceable drafting.
She may draft very clearly herself, or she may not: her language,
again, might do the job but only by using now-accepted, but
circuitous, formulations. She may be seen as signaling desirable
"mover-and-shaker" status: she is showing that she cares about the
transaction documents only insofar as required to get any particular
job done, and will not waste the client's money catering to more
aesthetic concerns. (Indeed, among the indicia of caring too much
about aesthetics is not only taking the trouble to make one's own
changes to the form beautiful, but also revising the language already
in the form to that end.) Junior lawyers also may benefit by not
subjecting their supervising lawyers to changes the seniors would
have to spend more time reviewing, and, indeed, might not under-
stand. Finally, as I will explore at greater length below, the lawyer is
not diversified in her employment. She will appraise a remote risk of
32. Pursuing exceptionally good outcomes, like innovative structures, likely only can be
done by exposing oneself more to bad outcomes. See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence,
supra note 5, at 353-58. Pursuing good, but not extraordinarily good, outcomes energetically, so
as to slightly exceed the industry standard, may be quite consistent with avoiding bad outcomes.
Examples include a quicker turnaround time and a more careful drafting job with fewer inapt
definitions.
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being fired differently than she would appraise a remote risk that one
of the many stocks in her portfolio will lose all its value.33
B. Psychological (Internal) Dynamics
1. Overestimating the Likelihood of Bad Events
Many lawyers in large firms, even some at relatively senior levels,
seem to assign higher probabilities to certain bad events than is
warranted.34 Lawyers overestimate the probability that: (a) they have
made a mistake; (b) the mistake will be detected (since, they believe,
their supervisors have near-superhuman powers); (c) the mistake will
have really bad consequences for them; (d) the mistake will have
really bad consequences for the client; and/or (e) they're less
competent than their peers. My evidence as to the actual probabili-
ties, and lawyers' estimates thereof, is solely anecdotal; still, I have
collected many anecdotes, and they have all supported this view.35
Bad outcomes are more heavily weighted in part because they are
more available and more vivid. As Daniel Schacter reports in his
work on memory, subjects recall most accurately events of high
emotional arousal. 36 Some of the literature suggests physiological and
evolutionary reasons why memories associated with charged events
might be remembered more vividly.37
If many lawyers overestimate the probability of bad events, they
might practice law defensively, doing mostly that which they can
defend. They therefore should favor relying on the form, which
someone, and indeed, many people, some of who are quite senior, has
33. See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56
J. POL. ECON. 279, 285-86 (1948); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
86 n.28 (1978). On problems in estimating remote risks, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 13,
38.
34. Part of the story may be an "availability heuristic," where the image of some bad
outcome that befell the lawyer's compatriot is etched in the lawyer's brain. See generally
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6.
35. A related dynamic is the tendency to overestimate remote likelihoods. See Friedman
& Savage, supra note 33, as to overestimating the likelihood of remote, catastrophic outcomes.
The dynamic I am describing can accommodate, but does not require, that the initial likelihood
be remote. In any event, overestimation of remote bad outcomes may be outweighed by
underestimations reflecting unrealistic optimism. See Cass R. Sunnstein, Introduction to
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1, 4-5.
36. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE
PAST 192-217 (1996).
37. See id.
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vetted, rather than relying on themselves, whom no one has vetted.
They also should favor fewer changes in the aggregate, and less
changes that are structural. But they also may be willing to make
benign additions, such as new boilerplate as to such matters as "he"
also meaning "she" where applicable, with little regard to the ever-
increasing size and unwieldiness of the contract.
2. Imperfect Information and Ambiguity
In the same vein, lawyers might respond to imperfect infor-
mation by clinging unduly to the known. Indeed, assessing how much
information one has, how much sense it makes to acquire more, how
to acquire information, and, even more fundamentally, what
constitutes information, is often difficult. Economics typically glosses
over these types of problems, speaking as though one could easily
assess how much information one had and whether the costs of
acquiring additional information exceed the benefits. But the
problems are real: for instance, if you ask someone a question, how
do you appraise whether they've given you the right answer?
Economics deals with the many ways people signal authoritativeness
and credibility. But a need for information can arise without an
authoritative or credible source close at hand. For lawyers, this
problem is most acute at the junior levels, but it never goes away
completely. The junior lawyer may have difficulty knowing who to
believe as to whether bylaws must be filed with the secretary of state
or not: does he believe the midlevel associate who says they do? Or
does he draw the contrary inference from the statute saying that the
certificate of incorporation is filed with the secretary of state but
silent as to the bylaws? And there may be political reasons why he
cannot ask someone he knows is authoritative: very early, he will
learn enough to know not to ask a senior lawyer, especially his
supervisor, a question that parades his ignorance. Ostentatious, or
serious, mistakes likely will be caught; lesser, or less obvious, mistakes
may not be. The incentive to rely on precedent, and shy away from
one's own judgment, is clear: knowing that you do not know impels
you towards relying on someone else's knowledge-that of the
authors of the form.
Indeed, scholars have considered extensively how people make
decisions under imperfect information. One strain of literature
distinguishes between "risk" and "uncertainty." The paradigm of risk
is traditional gambling: the odds-probabilities-are known; the
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outcome is not. By contrast, in situations of uncertainty one cannot
assign precise probabilities. 38  When asked to choose between
uncertainty and risk, people choose risk. The more uncertainty there
is, the greater temptation to retreat to something potentially offering
greater certainty, or at least a good defense. In this regard as well,
the form offers comfort.
3. Other Dynamics
Various other psychological dynamics give precedent an edge
over innovation. Three such dynamics are a status quo bias, an
"anchoring effect," and a conformity bias.39 The status quo bias
favors, not surprisingly, the status quo. The form-the way things
have been done in the past-counts as the status quo for this purpose;
the bias is towards retaining the status quo rather than changing it.
Indeed, such a bias would also favor continuing to draft in legalese
even when clearer formulations were close at hand. I know from
personal experience that fluency in legalese is all too readily acquired;
the translation becomes automatic and unconscious. Similarly, the
anchoring effect favors one's initial starting point, which, in this case,
is again the form. Finally, the conformity effect also favors the form,
since each lawyer is surrounded by others using the form; the lawyer
will want to conform to his peers and seniors. Intuition supports the
existence of these dynamics: if we see something done a certain way,
we think of that way as being the right way; doing the thing any other
way would be noticeable and jarring, and would seem wrong.
IV. THE FoRM's IMPERFECTIONS AND WHY THEY PERSIST
A. The Form's Imperfections
The imperfections this essay seeks to explain chiefly are unneces-
sary length and complexity, and, sometimes, ambiguities that too
readily allow for multiple interpretations. I've discussed above the
context in which such imperfections arise. Lawyers need a way to
38. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT, 198-99 (Augustus M.
Kelley 1964) (1920). See also Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and
Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1995); Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth,
Decision Making Under Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 41.
39. See generally Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 5; BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6.
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access other lawyers' experience; forms are well suited for this
purpose. Forms are used and revised in the heat of the moment;
there is almost never time to go back and "fix" things more elegantly.
Indeed, there is a fundamental tension between the contract's status
as contract and its status as form. A contract is drafted for a client; its
use as a form is, from the client's perspective, incidental and not
something the client will subsidize. If a lawyer were supposed to be
drafting a form rather than a contract, she could attend more to
structural integrity-she could address problems with more than the
smallest band-aids. But, as discussed in Part II above, many forms
are full of the paradigm band-aid, "anything in the foregoing to the
contrary notwithstanding," because someone in one transaction
argued that section 7.2 might raise an intimation contrary to the
intent of 4.3, and someone in another transaction argued that section
4.7 might be read as contradicting section 2.2(a) and so on. The
cumulative effect of such clauses can readily be imagined.
Moreover, the contract production process does not contem-
plate, nor could it, all its participants having full information about
the present, much less the future. And circumstances, including
"noise," may make it difficult to determine what provisions work and
what provisions don't work. Things may go wrong for many reasons.
If they do, clients may blame their lawyers, and senior lawyers may
blame their juniors, regardless of where fault lies. And lawyers may
worry more than is warranted that things will go wrong and that they
will be blamed. Finally, because the form is one's point of departure,
its provisions necessarily have a mantle of correctness; deviations
have to be, in a sense, "justified." Things already written down come
pre-legitimized-not just in the political sense that there's no payoff
in challenging them, but also in the psychological sense that they
"look like they belong."
As a result, deviations from the form, especially more structural
or innovative deviations, are disfavored. Necessary changes to use
the form in the new transaction are more apt to be as limited as
possible to "do the job." Deletions generally must meet a high
threshold of justification: omitting a provision because it doesn't do
much, but does clutter up the form, rarely suffices. But inclusion of
new boilerplate that doesn't seem to help but couldn't hurt requires
much less justification.40 Contracts get progressively longer and more
cumbersome, and usually not to any positive end.
40. Movers and shakers won't spend their time including lots of new boilerplate. However,
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B. Why the Imperfections Persist
1. Switching Is Costly
Recent scholarship has discussed economic reasons why defer-
ence to a form might exceed that warranted on substantive grounds.41
These reasons echo the reasons I discussed supra Part III.A.
Moreover, once the production process using the form is in place
throughout the transacting community, incremental costs of using it
are low; costs of switching to another method are higher. Other
switching costs may also be at issue. As I have discussed, the
production process involves forms created and updated in actual
transactions, where junior level scribes do most of the drafting, and
senior lawyers review in carefully honed bursts. Switching from this
process would be costly. An alternative mechanism to make lawyers'
accumulated wisdom available throughout the firm, and make
changes reflecting new conventions and law, would need to be
devised. Indeed, personnel requirements for the firm might be
different, such that hiring would have to be done more carefully. If
scribes no longer could play an important role, the firm would have to
figure out how to weed out scribes who wouldn't soon progress to
more responsible work, or, better yet, figure out how never to hire
them. As I discuss below, firms now have the luxury of hiring first
and weeding out later.
2. The Production Process May Offer Benefits
The production process may offer specialization benefits. And
the process may help firms distinguish between promising and less-
promising junior lawyers while making profitable use of both.42 The
less-promising juniors may take full advantage of the form's ability to
let them do their jobs without thinking very much, staying at a level
only slightly above Preppie's. The more promising reveal themselves
as such by taking a more active approach, and understanding more
about the form and the production process. Less-promising lawyers
those aspiring to mover-and-shakerdom but doomed to failure sometimes think it looks
impressive to include lots of new boilerplate; a few such people is all it takes to add appreciably
to the "miscellaneous" article at the end of most contracts.
41. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 5.
42. The less-promising lawyers must, of course, meet a certain baseline, or they could not
even function as- scribes. But firms are, in my experience, generally capable of weeding out
those falling below that baseline at the pre-hiring stage.
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may be difficult to detect in the hiring process; they also may be in
larger supply than more-promising lawyers. Thus, the firm may
benefit by using a production process that makes profitable use of
less-promising lawyers, and defers the need to make fine differen-
tiations among varying levels of skill until such differentiations are
easier to make.
3. The Net Benefits to Seeking Perfection May Be Small
Why don't the Freunds of this world exploit these imperfections
to their benefit? 43 Perhaps because the benefits to doing so may not
exceed the costs. Developing a perfect form, and a production
process to keep it pristine, would be one way to exploit the imper-
fections. But who would pay to develop this form and process? It is
hard to imagine clients paying. The benefit to each client is small;
moreover, how and why would clients band together for such a
purpose, especially in these days where clients often turn to (fairly
mobile) lawyers rather than firms, and use different firms for
different sorts of transactions?
Thus, the form and process would have to be developed at firm
expense. Some of the firm's more talented lawyers would be diverted
from client-servicing, revenue-generating activities. And, unless the
firm's leadership was perceived as being committed to the project,
talented junior lawyers with political savvy (and, in my experience,
most talented junior lawyers do have political savvy) would somehow
be "busy" when the form project taskmasters were seeking volun-
teers. Talented senior lawyers might need to be heavily involved, and
the revenue loss might be sizeable.
Moreover, the task itself is difficult and complex, even for tal-
ented lawyers.- How much should one change? How different can
the form look from that used by other firms? And which provisions
are only vestiges of history, serving no useful function today? Is it
worthwhile to truncate the typical granting clause in a secured loan
agreement, which "grants, bargains, sells, assigns, transfers, conveys,
mortgages, pledges, and confirms" unto the lender a security interest
in the collateral? What about words like "whereas," "witnesseth"
43. I do not ask why Freund and his ilk don't arbitrage the imperfections until they
disappear; money may theoretically be in infinite supply, but Freund-like attributes clearly are
not.
44. Indeed, the task may be amenable to specialization. Some lawyers may be better at
seeing the "big picture," others may know the history of the various provisions, and others may
be the best draftspeople.
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and "know these men by their presents?" And what about the deeper
structural issues? For instance, there are separate "articles" entitled
''representations and warranties" and "indemnities." Conceptually,
the difference between the two types of articles is murky at best.45 It
seems unlikely that someone smart but completely ignorant would
write a contract from scratch treating the two as qualitatively
different. But is it worthwhile to integrate the two sections? Perhaps;
perhaps not.
Even if the form and production process could be developed,
how would the firm get its lawyers to use them? The firm might need
to make an institutional commitment to this end, a commitment it
would need to sustain throughout the transitional period. Indeed,
habit-propelled lawyers might use the form once and then use their
own versions of the form subsequently, defeating the project's whole
purpose. And how would other firms react to the firm's use of a
different-seeming form? Most likely, the result would be additional
costs as the other firms bridle at having to learn something new. They
might fear competition from the perfect form; or they might think the
firm was hoisted by its own petard by elevating aesthetics over
"getting the job done." In either case, the other firms' reactions
might be unfavorable.
A more modest endeavor would be cleaning up the form: allot-
ting time after transactions to clean up the more egregious clutter.
But keeping the forms clean would be expensive or short lived. Since
negotiated changes to contracts are almost always narrowly tailored
to satisfy the particular parties, potential for damage to the contract's
structural integrity is ever present. Preventing or quickly repairing
damage would require frequent, costly "inspections."
Finally, the benefits of an improved form might be smaller than
they initially appear. The improved form should be substantively
better. It also should be easier to use, after an initial learning
investment has been made. But lawyers who read and write contracts
for a living have already made the investment in learning about the
45. One difference may be that representations and warranties are used to elicit
information. For instance, the buyer, who typically does the first draft of the acquisition
agreement, includes many "flat" representations, such as that the seller has furnished all his
contracts, no one is suing or even threatening to sue the seller, the seller is not in violation of
any laws, and so on. As the negotiations proceed, the seller explains which of these
representations he can give and which need to be "qualified" with knowledge or materiality. (I
discuss this further in my work-in-progress, What We Do (and Don't) Complete In Incomplete
Contracts.) However, even given this function of representations, the Representations and
Indemnities articles nevertheless coexist less than elegantly.
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present form, with all its imperfections. They have learned its foibles,
and now scarcely notice them. They incur only small incremental
costs on account of the form's unwieldiness and inartful drafting.
Indeed, such lawyers may value contracts' seeming inaccessibility: it
may help them justify their fees. And it may help them set up
barriers to entry by lawyers in less-sophisticated firms.
4. Why Multiple Iterations Don't Make the Form (More) Perfect
The form represents the accumulated wisdom of everyone who
has worked on it. Every mistake caught has been fixed, including
mistakes of commission and omission. But what set of mistakes has
been caught: those caught through routine reviews, those caught
serendipitously (or because they run afoul of the reviewer's pet
peeve46), and those that were recognized to have caused trouble. The
mistakes that are caught are necessarily a subset of the mistakes
made: the subset likely does not include most mistakes, and may very
well not include many big mistakes. Even catching a mistake is no
assurance that it gets corrected in a way that really helps. In this
regard, consider the discussion in Part II, supra, about Stanley Moon:
he figures out that he needs to tell the Devil that he and Margaret
should be in love with each other but not married to other people; the
Devil makes them nuns in a convent.
Moreover, the iterations are not always efficient at correcting
mistakes. Doing routine reviews is rarely a way for a lawyer to
endear herself to her seniors or clients; moreover, considering the
extremes under which most transactions are done, even if a lawyer
were so inclined, she would scarcely have the time. (And whom
would she bill for the time?) Even mistakes caught are not always
fixed. Mistakes are often discovered when one party is determining
its rights under the contract-that is, when things are not going well.
There may be noise as to what the mistake is. More importantly, the
parties' first priority is to reach an accommodation. The accommo-
dation might involve a contract amendment; more likely, it does not.
Even if it does, the amendment is more likely to be a band-aid for
these particular parties in this particular situation than a correction of
the form. Any urgency is likely to wither once the parties have come
46. For example, some lawyers routinely read the "notice" provisions and replace
references to "telex" with "fax" and "e-mail"; however, not all "forms" have been fixed, and,
for a long time after anybody was using telex, many contracts still expressly permitted notice
only by telex.
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to an accommodation; fixing the form likely stays at the bottom of the
lawyer's "to do" list, and never gets done. New mistakes are made
too, offsetting the gains of cumulated mistake correction. Mistake
correction also does not occur efficiently in the ordinary course of
negotiation: like negotiations in distress situations, initial negotiations
resolve contentious points with band-aids that change the offending
provision with little regard to the effects on the rest of the contract.
The mistake correction process is far from smooth. But mistake
correction would seem to provide the best case for multiple iterations'
perfecting powers. Multiple iterations seem less well suited to
cleaning up inartful language, deleting outdated boilerplate or
redundancy, or making structural changes beyond what's necessary to
"do the job" in a particular transaction. Thus, even with multiple
iterations, practice does not make perfect.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, looking at particular features of contracts, and, indeed,
contracts as a whole, the conclusion that we could do better might
seem inescapable. Yet, looking at the process by which contracts are
created, and considering lawyers' incentives and proclivities, we might
wonder whether unwieldiness and inartfulness might not be the
smallest price we could pay for the benefits the process offers.
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APPENDIX
"Subordinated Indebtedness" means unsecured Funded Indebt-
edness of the Company which
A. On the date on which the status of such Funded Indebtedness
is determined for any purpose hereof,
(1) has a final maturity not earlier than the maturity date of the
last installment of principal then payable on the outstanding Notes,
(2) has a Weighted Average Life to Maturity at least as long as
the remaining Weighted Average Life to Maturity of the Notes, and,
(3) is not subject to payment, redemption or other retirement by
means of any installment, sinking fund, serial maturity or other
required payments at a rate greater than the rate at which the unpaid
principal amount of the outstanding Notes shall be payable in
installments as herein and in the Notes provided; and
B. Is issued or assumed pursuant to, or evidenced by, an inden-
ture or other instrument which contains provisions for the
subordination of such Funded Indebtedness (to which appropriate
reference shall be made in the instruments evidencing such Funded
Indebtedness if not contained therein) to the Notes (and, at the
option of the Company, if so provided, to other Indebtedness for
Money Borrowed of the Company, either generally or as specifically
designated) substantially as follows (without limitation as to further,
not inconsistent, provisions, if so desired):
Subordination. Anything in this Subordinated Note to the con-
trary notwithstanding, the indebtedness evidenced by this
Subordinated Note shall be subordinate and junior in right of
payment, to the extent and in the manner hereinafter set forth, to all
indebtedness of the Company evidenced by its X% Senior Notes
from time to time outstanding (whether outstanding at the date of
this Subordinated Note or issued after the date of this Subordinated
Note and as said X% Senior Notes may at any time and from time to
time be modified or amended in any respect) and to (All such
indebtedness to which this Subordinated Note is subordinate as
aforesaid being sometimes hereinafter referred to as 'Superior
Indebtedness'):
(i) In the event of any insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings,
and any receivership, liquidation, reorganization or other similar
proceedings in connection therewith, relative to the Company or to
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its creditors, as such, or to its property, and in the event of any
proceedings for voluntary liquidation, dissolution or other winding up
of the Company, whether or not involving insolvency or bankruptcy,
then the holders of Superior Indebtedness shall be entitled to receive
payment in full of all principal, premium (if any) and interest on all
Superior Indebtedness (including interest thereon accruing after the
commencement of any such proceedings) before the holder of this
Subordinated Note shall be entitled to receive any payment on
account of principal, premium (if any) or interest on this Subordi-
nated Note. Pursuant to the foregoing (but subject to the power of a
court of competent jurisdiction to make other equitable provisions
reflecting the rights conferred herein upon Superior Indebtedness and
the holders thereof with respect to the subordinated indebtedness
represented by this Subordinated Note and the holder hereof by a
lawful plan of reorganization under applicable bankruptcy law) the
holders of Superior Indebtedness (until payment in full of all
principal, premium (if any) and interest on all Superior Indebtedness,
including interest thereon accruing after the commencement of any
such proceedings) shall be entitled to receive for application in
payment thereof any payment or distribution of any kind or
character, whether in cash or property or securities, which may be
payable or deliverable in any such proceedings in respect of this
Subordinated Note (including any such payment or distribution which
may be payable or deliverable by virtue of the provisions of, or any
security for, any securities which are subordinated and junior in right
of payment to this Subordinated Note), except securities which are
subordinated and junior (to at least the same extent as this Subordi-
nated Note) in right of payment to the payment of all Superior
Indebtedness then outstanding. The holder of this subordinated Note
shall not exercise or attempt to exercise any right of setoff or
counterclaim in respect of any obligations of the holder of this
Subordinated Note to the Company against the obligations of the
Company under this Subordinated Note if the effect thereof shall be
to reduce the amount of any such payment or distribution to which
the holders of Superior Indebtedness would be entitled in the absence
of such setoff or counterclaim; and if and to the extent that,
notwithstanding the foregoing, the holder of this Subordinated Note
is required by any mandatory provision of law to exercise any such
right of setoff or counterclaim, each reduction of the amount owing
on account of the principal of or premium (if any) or interest on this
Subordinated Note by reason of such setoff or counterclaim shall be
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deemed to be a payment by the Company in a like amount in respect
of this Subordinated Note to which the second sentence of this
paragraph (i) shall apply.
(ii) In the event that this Subordinated Note is declared due and
payable before its expressed maturity because of the occurrence of an
event of default hereunder (under circumstances when the provisions
of the foregoing paragraph (i) or the following paragraph (iii) shall
not be applicable), the holders of Superior Indebtedness then due, or
becoming due by acceleration or otherwise prior to the expiration of
a period of 75 days after the date on which the Company or a holder
of this Subordinated Note gives to the holders of the Superior
Indebtedness the written notice provided for below in this paragraph
(ii), shall be entitled to receive payment in full of all principal,
premium (if any) and interest on all such Superior Indebtedness
before the holder of this Subordinated Note shall be entitled to
receive any payment on account of the principal, premium (if any) or
interest on this Subordinated Note other than any such principal,
premium (if any) and interest due otherwise than by reason of such
declaration. For the purpose of this paragraph (ii) the Company
agrees, for the benefit of the holders of Superior Indebtedness as well
as the holder of this Subordinated Note, that, if any such declaration
remains unrescinded for 15 days, the Company will promptly give
written notice thereof to all holders of Superior Indebtedness. If the
company fails to give such notice, the holder of this Subordinated
Note may do so on behalf of the Company. At any time within 75
days after the date on which such notice is given, any holder of
outstanding Superior Indebtedness shall have the right to declare all
Superior Indebtedness held by such holder to be due and payable,
whereupon such Superior Indebtedness shall forthwith become
immediately due and payable regardless of the expressed maturity
date thereof. Nothing herein shall prevent the holder of this
Subordinated Note from seeking any remedy allowed at law or in
equity so long as any judgement or decree obtained thereby makes
provision for enforcing this paragraph (ii).
(iii) In the event that any default shall occur and be continuing
with respect to any Superior Indebtedness permitting the holders of
such Superior Indebtedness to accelerate the maturity thereof, the
holder of this Subordinated Note shall not be entitled to receive any
payment on account of principal, premium (if any) or interest hereon
(including any such payment which would cause a default) if either
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(a) judicial proceedings shall be pending in respect of such default, or
(b) written notice of such default shall have been given to the
Company by any holder of Superior Indebtedness and a period of 180
days in the case of a monetary default or 90 days in the case of any
other default shall not have expired since the giving of such notice;
provided, however, that this paragraph (iii) shall apply to only one
such notice given in any 12 months' period. The Company, forthwith
upon receipt of any such notice, shall send a copy thereof to the
holder of this Subordinated Note.
No present or future holder of Superior Indebtedness shall be
prejudiced in such holder's right to enforce subordination of this
Subordinated Note by any act or failure to act on the part of the
Company. The provisions of this Section are solely for the purpose of
defining the relative rights of the holders of Superior Indebtedness on
the one hand, and the holder of this Subordinated Note on the other
hand, and nothing herein shall impair, as between the Company and
the holder of this Subordinated Note, the obligation of the Company,
which is unconditional and absolute, to pay to the holder hereof the
principal and interest hereon in accordance with the terms hereof, nor
shall anything herein prevent the holder of this Subordinated Note
from exercising all remedies otherwise permitted by applicable law or
hereunder upon default hereunder, subject to the rights, if any, under
this Section of holders of Superior Indebtedness to receive cash,
property or securities otherwise payable or deliverable to the holder
of this Subordinated Note and all amounts which are deemed to be
payments in respect of this Subordinated Note by reason of setoff or
counterclaim in respect of any obligations of the holder of this
Subordinated Note to the Company against the obligations of the
Company under this Subordinated Note.
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